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Abstract. British reactions to China’s increasing engagement with Africa in recent years have
been manifested in particularly negative and reductive ways tending to depict China’s
presence in Africa as destructive and self-serving, in contrast to Britain’s more enlightened,
supportive approach. However, more recently oﬃcial discourse has begun to stress the
shared outlook between British and Chinese objectives, emphasising Chinese moves towards
a more constructive, development-focused approach in Africa. This article discusses the
ways in which China in Africa is viewed in British political circles and assesses the degree
to which such views resonate with the British sense of its own idealised identity. It suggests
that the two narratives represent two sides of a dual ‘liberal’ approach to the problem of
‘non-liberal’ actors in international politics: first the tendency to reject and see them as
outside the international order; and second the attempt to rehabilitate them and bring them
within it. The article concludes by exploring a number of reasons for the particular ways in
which Britain, China and Africa are configured, arguing that this dual conception represents
a sense of ambiguity about the potential universality of liberalism.
Julia Gallagher is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations,
Royal Holloway, University of London.
British elites, proud of Britain’s enlightened and benign policy in sub-Saharan
Africa in recent years, have only gradually begun to wake up to China’s growing
presence there.1 It was as if a child, earnestly engaged in building an elaborate
sandcastle has just realised that a bigger child, with a tractor and a very diﬀerent
concept of what a sandcastle should look like, had arrived and begun destroying
and building on the same patch of sand. British reactions take two forms. The initial
and popular reaction – found amongst backbench MPs and some government
* An early version of this article was presented at the European Africa Studies Conference in Leipzig,
June 2009. Thanks to Roland Marchal, Daniel Large, Chris Alden, Hannes Baumann, Manjeet
Ramgotra and the anonymous RIS reviewers who read and made many useful comments on earlier
drafts of the article.
1 Throughout the article I will be discussing sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter simply referred to as
‘Africa’). In ignoring north Africa I am reflecting the British policy understanding of the continent
which groups north Africa in with the Middle East (MENA). Egypt, Libya and Algeria, for example,
are therefore treated as part of a region which oﬀers more pressing and complex political, economic
and security interests and challenges to that of sub-Saharan Africa which is largely viewed in terms
of aid and development. The exception to this is South Africa which has always appeared to present
exceptional political and trade interests.
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oﬃcials who work on Africa, and amplified in the media – has been one of hostility
and suspicion: ‘British space’ has been invaded, ‘British projects’ spoiled. A second
view has also begun to emerge in government discourse, which suggests that China’s
engagement is to be welcomed as potentially positive and beneficial for Africa; that
China, with help from Britain, might come to realise the benefits of the international
consensus on how to engage with Africa.2 These represent a pragmatism, according
to Chris Alden, that has seen a series of cautious attempts to engage with Chinese
activity on the continent.3 More recently they have become overtly welcoming,
suggesting that China and Britain actually share objectives to some degree in Africa,
and that it might be possible to further reconcile their work there.
How far is this new pragmatic perspective displacing the hostile reaction, or are
these reflections of persistently diverse and even contradictory reactions to China’s
engagement in Africa? More broadly, what can such reactions tell us about
tendencies to demonise and socialise within International Relations (IR) – most
particularly in the context of a state that sees itself as part of a liberal international
community, and its reaction to states that lie beyond this community?
This article attempts to explore and explain elite British reactions to China’s
engagement in Africa. It draws on interviews with British politicians and oﬃcials
who work on African policy or engage there through the work on All-Party
Parliamentary Groups on Africa, and on government documents and speeches
produced by the Foreign Oﬃce (FCO) and Department for International
Development (DfID). Through an examination of discourses about Africa and
China’s role there, it establishes a picture of the way in which ideas of
British-African-Chinese relationships are constituted, and makes suggestions as to
how these stem from and help reinforce a sense of state identity.
In the first section I will argue that the British conception of Africa and its
policy in recent years there is best understood within a constructivist ontology. The
role of ideas in forming British self-conception and policy is particularly resonant
in Africa because of the relative lack of British material interests there. This can
be highlighted through a comparison with recent French and US policy in Africa
both of which are rooted in more tangible interests. It is therefore more plausible
to understand the French and US attitudes towards Africa and Chinese engage-
ment there within a more realist framework, while the role of ideas and identity
play a much larger role in the British case. The rest of the article discusses the two
British approaches to Chinese engagement in Africa, drawing on oﬃcial policy
documents and interviews with British politicians and oﬃcials, and exploring
historical parallels. Section two explores historical comparisons and precedents,
focusing on British demonisation of rival European powers during the colonial
project in Africa. The third section describes the modern demonisation of China by
British policy elites; and the fourth discusses the more rational and newly-emerging
discourse that seeks to describe a new British relationship with China over Africa
as one of tutor in development, bringing China within wider liberal rationales.
2 For an example of this more cautious approach which both welcomes the potential benefits of
China’s engagement in Africa, while gently pointing towards the importance of promoting good
governance, see DfID fact sheet: ‘Promoting Growth in Africa: working with China’ (2006),
available at: {http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/china-africa-factsheet.pdf} cited on
7 July 2009.
3 Chris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007), p. 108.
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Finally, I will explore the possible meanings of such depictions. I will suggest
that both the demonisation of China in this African context, and the idea that
China can be civilised by Britain, are reflections of a particular liberal sense of self.
This draws on Dipesh Chakrabarty’s suggestion that liberal historicism views
non-liberal others as both external to the civilised world, in opposition to it,
destabilising and potentially destructive, and as potentially – perhaps inevitably –
redeemable, able to be reconciled to the liberal, rational, universal logic. Liberalism
both ‘recognises and neutralises diﬀerence’.4 The particular example of British
perceptions of China in Africa highlights the tension between this dual approach
to diﬀerence and, I suggest, illustrates an ambiguity with the idea that liberalism
can be universalised – that the inevitability and logic of liberalism which must
absorb all non-liberal actors is constantly undermined by the tendency to objectify
or reify the villainous, outlying ‘other’. The conclusion of the article explores the
extent to which both views – although they exist in tension – might have come to
underwrite a British subjectivity and identity: one in providing an alternative
‘other’, foil to the subject’s logic and rightness; the other as an aﬃrmation that
alternatives are unviable and must succumb to the logic of liberal modernity.
Constructing British policy in Africa
Peter Hays Gries, in his study of Chinese foreign policy, argues that international
relationships shape national self-perception through the interdependence of dis-
course, policy and identity. In his example, the relationship between China and
America is partially constitutive of a collective Chinese identity.5 It can also, of
course, be argued that identity shapes international relations: the way we see
ourselves defines the way we relate to others internationally. This approach departs
from realist ‘interest-based’ accounts that suggest that foreign policy and inter-
national relations are purely or largely generated by domestic or state material
interests, in particular security, geo-political strategy and economic opportunity.
In the case of Africa, in particular, the relationship between British identity and
the imagination of Africa and British policy there were redefined in particular ways
during the Blair era, driven by key actors’ ethical and emotional attachment to
Africa; by the Labour Party’s identification with particular causes such as the
anti-colonial and anti-Apartheid movements; by broader historical conceptions of
Britain’s benign role in Africa in, for example, the abolition of the slave trade and
the civilising colonial mission; and by the way these resonated with modern British
conceptions of Africa popularised by celebrity-driven aid initiatives and the British
media’s depictions of Africa as an object of pity and charity which could be
rescued through British eﬀorts.6
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical diﬀerence (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 48.
5 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: pride, politics and diplomacy (Berkley: University of
California Press, 2004), p. 19.
6 New Labour’s adoption in 1997 of a foreign policy with an ‘ethical element’, and the establishment of
DfID, were part of an attempt to diﬀerentiate itself from the outgoing Conservative administration
which had pursued a more overtly realist foreign policy, in which international development was
relatively neglected. On Africa in particular, its approach had been defined by what Labour regarded
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Ideationally, such depictions were brought to play within a liberal cosmopolitan
order promoted by Blair – described for example in his 1999 Chicago speech on
the doctrine of the international community – which promoted liberal intervention
and the responsibility to protect as moral imperatives. In doing this Blair sought
to identify and to shape an implicit understanding of a liberal international
community within which he wanted to define Britain.
The self-understanding of this liberal international community rests on implicit
or ‘deep’ theory and assumptions about individualism, choice, rights and liberty.7
For my purposes here, there are two important liberal themes that identify ‘liberal
states’ and diﬀerentiate them from ‘illiberal states’. The first is a cosmopolitan
sense of the universality of morality that is rooted in the individual. It leads to the
idea that it is possible and desirable to frame and promote a set of universal norms,
embodied, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Criminal Court that promotes and pursues universal justice. Non-
liberal states are those whose political elites deny or resist these; and they are the
states upon which the reforming eﬀorts of such institutions are focused. The
discourse tends to assume an aﬃnity between non-elites in these countries and
liberal values, leading to the idea that international liberal actors support and
speak for ordinary people. The second is an implicit sense of progress, which is due
to the growth of rationality. Political diﬀerences are depicted as a struggle between
‘progressive’ liberals versus ideological, backward-looking or unenlightened non-
liberals – the ‘outlying other’. The progress of rationality should see an increasing
convergence as modernisation converts and harmonises. One key way for this to
happen is through processes of ‘socialisation’, which, for many liberals, is achieved
through multilateralism; the coordinating of national policies in international
forums and institutions (nominal multilateralism), and the increasing sharing of
norms and principles (qualitative multilateralism).8 Liberals are ostensibly optimis-
tic – they assume that persuasive undercurrents will gradually lead to the reform
and rehabilitation of non-liberals.
This approach supported a host of British Africa initiatives including military
intervention in Sierra Leone to restore a democratically-elected regime, substantial
increases in aid and debt-write-oﬀ for the poorest, reform-minded African
governments, and culminated in a ‘year for Africa’ in 2005 during which Blair
launched his Commission for Africa.9 And it resonated with – and in time
contributed to – the broader liberal international consensus on Africa defined
around the promotion of ‘universal’ goods such as human rights, good governance
and international justice.10 Africa as an on-going site of development and good
as a sacrifice of principle to material interests in the refusal to impose sanctions on South Africa in the
1980s, and neglect, as in the failure to intervene to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The
establishment of DfID, in particular, was meant to demonstrate the increased importance of
international aid, and the separation of the aid agenda from the more ‘political’ FCO. DfID came to
represent the ‘moral wing’ of government. See Julia Gallagher, Britain and Africa under Blair: in
pursuit of the good state (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming, 2011).
7 David Williams, ‘Liberalism and “Development Discourse”’, Africa, 63:3 (1993), pp. 419–29.
8 John Ruggie, ‘Third Try at World Order? America and multilateralism after the Cold War’, Political
Science Quarterly, 109:4 (1994), pp. 553–70.
9 For an account of Blair’s Africa policies, see Tom Porteous: Britain in Africa, (London: Zed Books,
2008).
10 Tom Young: ‘“A project to be realised”: global liberalism and contemporary Africa’, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, 24:3 (1995), pp. 527–46.
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projects came to engender a sense of Britain as an energetic and potent
international actor, playing a key role in an idealised liberal international order.
Thus Africa in recent years became an important expression of Britain’s best liberal
self for Britain’s political elites.11
The idea of British aggression or pursuit of self-interest is largely absent from
this depiction. Instead, Britain engages with Africa because it is a ‘moral cause’, a
‘duty’ and ‘the right thing to do’.12 This is far more than a rhetorical approach:
the idea of Africa as a cause for Britain, and of the British state engaging there in
a pure and disinterested way is an important component of British state actors’
conception of themselves and the political system they engage in. Africa matters to
Britain as a representation of an ‘ethical foreign policy’, a point of diﬀerentiation
from other parts of state activity and policy, and from the ways in which other
parts of the world engage there. As such, it contributes to a sense of British
identity as a generous and benign actor, projecting an ideal Britain – generous,
altruistic, capable and just – onto Africa.13
The traction of such an approach has been increased by the relative lack of
tangible British interests in the continent. According to Christopher Clapham, this
was a significant factor behind British indiﬀerence towards Africa from indepen-
dence up to the Blair era.14 However, the revival of engagement with Africa under
Blair has been interpreted by some as being rooted in more material interests such
as pacifying dissatisfied Labour Party members, maintaining a position of power
over Africa, or promoting capitalist relations internationally.15 Elements of
self-interest doubtless do exist – Africa’s oil reserves are exploited by British
companies, the British arms industry occasionally wins lucrative contracts from
African governments.16 These tend to be either neutralised under a harmonies of
interest discourse – promoting trade supports our economy and their development
– or allowed to quietly bubble along under the surface, occasionally popping up to
embarrass the FCO, as, for example, happened with BAE deals in Tanzania and
South Africa. In contrast, eﬀorts to reign in UK commercial interests where they
were thought to be in conflict with benign objectives have been made, as for
example in the ending of the link between trade and aid, the heavy pressure put
on pharmaceutical companies to make cheap anti-retroviral drugs available in
11 This approach was shared across the mainstream political spectrum, by Labour, Conservative and
Liberal Democrat MPs, Labour ministers, special advisors and oﬃcials from DfID and the FCO.
Julia Gallagher, ‘Healing the Scar: idealism, Africa and British policy under Blair’, African Aﬀairs,
108:432 (2009), pp. 435–51.
12 Blair described British policy in Africa in these terms in a speech he made in Ethiopia: Tony Blair,
‘Speech on Africa, Addis Ababa, 7 October 2004’, Downing Street Website, {www.number-10.gov.uk}
cited on 16 March, 2006.
13 Gallagher, ‘Healing the Scar’.
14 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: the politics of state survival (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
15 See David Chandler, ‘Rhetoric without Responsibility: the attraction of “ethical” foreign policy’,
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 5:3 (2003); David Slater and Morag Bell, ‘Aid
and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial: critical reflections on New Labour’s overseas development
strategy’, Development and Change, 33:2 (2002); Paul Cammack, ‘Global Governance, State Agency
and Competitiveness: the political economy of the Commission for Africa’, British Journal of Politics
and International Relations, 8 (2006).
16 For a discussion on Britain’s rather small interest in African oil (chiefly in Angola and Nigeria), see
Porteous, Britain in Africa, pp. 43–4. For a discussion of the UK arms trade with Africa, see Ian
Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Continuum, 2010), pp. 39–41.
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Africa, and attempts to restrict oil companies operating in the Niger Delta
pursuing environmentally damaging practices.17
Since 9/11 the idea that British foreign policy in Africa has been shaped by
concern over international terrorism – often linked to the opportunities oﬀered to
it by weak states – has also been argued.18 I think this has been overplayed, often
due to the tendency to conflate British and US approaches to Africa and security.
There are substantial diﬀerences in the historical and ideological engagement
between the US and UK in Africa with the idea of Africa and Britain in Africa
maintaining a stronger hold in British oﬃcials’ imaginations. Moreover, British
institutions are very diﬀerent, with DfID playing a far more assertive part in the
shaping of British Africa policy than USAID does in America. The view of Africa
as outside foreign policy as usual has been reinforced by the growing clout of DfID
in Africa where DfID posts usually exceed FCO posts in size and budget.19 This
has been supported by the influence of key British politicians and oﬃcials in recent
years who have identified themselves closely with the line promoted by the
development agencies, the churches and key charismatic figures such as Bob Geldof
and Bono.20 If foreign policy is directed within a melting pot of varying interests
and ideas, the mix has been heavily dominated since 1997 by the sense of Britain’s
‘ideal mission’ in Africa. Indeed, it remains diﬃcult to establish the existence of
tangible interests in countries such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Uganda, all of
which receive large amounts of British support.
The British approach can be contrasted with those of France and the US where
more overt interest-based approaches lend themselves more to a realist interpreta-
tion. France, for example, while also holding its relationship with Francophone
Africa as intrinsic to its identity, has tended to pursue material interests far more
energetically and openly.21 The US, on the other hand, has traditionally ignored
much of Africa, motivated by the perception that there are virtually no tangible
interests there.22 More recently, Bill Clinton became interested prioritising a
development agenda in Africa, something that was taken up by George W. Bush,
especially in a high-budget AIDS programme and, since 9/11, concerns over
terrorism in east Africa, coupled with Africa’s significant contribution to US
energy requirements, have led to a more substantial military engagement.23
Interestingly, the approach which comes closest to British self-idealisation is an
older Chinese conception of its engagement in Africa, a conception that survives
17 Interviews with FCO and DfID oﬃcials (2007–2009).
18 Jan Bachmann and Jana Honke, ‘“Peace and Security” as counterterrorism? The political eﬀects of
liberal interventions in Kenya’, African Aﬀairs, 109:434 (2010).
19 Interviews with FCO and DfID oﬃcials (2007–2009).
20 Geldof and Bono have both been drafted in to support the political parties’ development agendas.
For example, Geldof was a key player in Blair’s Africa Commission, and was later recruited by
David Cameron to help formulate Conservative policy on aid. Bono has made appearances at both
parties’ annual conferences. Both they, alongside British development NGOs and churches, were
particularly vocal in supporting Blair’s ‘year for Africa’ in 2005, formulating and promoting the
Make Poverty History Campaign. See Graham Harrison, ‘The Africanization of Poverty: a
retrospective on “Make Poverty History”’, African Aﬀairs, {doi:10.1093/afraf/adq025}.
21 On this, see Guy Martin, ‘Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations’, The Journal of
Modern African Studies, 22:1 (1995).
22 See Todd Moss, ‘US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: the limits of liberal universalism’, The
Journal of Modern African Studies, 33:2 (1995).
23 Nicolas van der Walle, ‘US Policy towards Africa: the Bush legacy and the Obama administration’,
African Aﬀairs, 109:434 (2010); Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 24–34.
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both in current Chinese state rhetoric and popular Chinese conceptions of Africa
and China’s role there. Julia Strauss, in her discussion of the Chinese state’s
representation of its approach to Africa, illustrates the ways in which policy is
rationalised and idealised in terms of China’s very diﬀerent ideologies of
self-determination, non-interference and the sanctity of sovereignty, and solidarity
between former colonies and fellow-developing countries. This was a key driver of
aid projects like the Tazara Railway, built in Tanzania and Zambia by the Chinese
in the 1960s, which was conceived as reflecting a Chinese ethos. ‘The success of the
friendship railroad was ascribed to elements that were in microcosm projections of
China’s best revolutionary self.’24 Strauss makes the point that in content and
degree, China’s engagement with the continent has moved far from disinterested
aid projects like the Tazara Railway towards more straightforwardly self-interested
investment, but much of the original ethos survives in rhetoric. ‘China’s discourse
on Africa continues to propagate a vision of China as a uniquely moral
international actor.’25
Support for this comes too from Simon Shen’s research on the Chinese online
communities’ perceptions of Africa which suggests that the state’s idealised
depictions of China’s relationships in Africa find popular resonance.26 In his
examination of the ways Africa is described, Shen suggests a number of factors
that propel this idealisation, including the ways in which Africa’s perceived
backwardness and role as a pupil to China is valued as a signifier of Chinese
progress, order and success, as well as an example of China’s enlightened
international role. For example, ‘China’s authoritarian model seems to be able to
oﬀer a perfect substitute for the chaos in Africa.’27 Also, ‘without this junior
partner and admirer of China reflecting China’s relative success, the Chinese users
find it hard to flaunt their sense of superiority [. . .] The Chinese commitment to
Africa still gives them [the online communities] a sense of national pride.’28
In this way, for both Britain and China, Africa has been a means of association
with a sense of a good project. It represents a source of aﬃrmation that the state
(British or Chinese) is connected to and author of ‘good’. For Britain, this is
achieved through its place in the liberal international order and the expression of
itself as a benign, liberal actor in Africa. Thus while foreign policy might be viewed
as a composite of the various institutional rationalities, and the motivations and
constructions of the actors involved, the constructivist approach which favours
ideas over interests is particularly useful in the case of Britain, Africa and China
in Africa.
In summary, Britain’s liberal identity draws on its relationship with Africa
through resonances with carefully selected historical moments when Britain ‘did
good’ in Africa; and through Blair’s cooption of Labour traditions of inter-
nationalism and support for development. Africa, partly because of the relative
lack of material British interests there, allows it to fit into and even lead, a liberal
24 Julia Strauss, ‘The Past in the Present: historical and rhetorical lineages in China’s relations with
Africa’, China Quarterly, 199 (2009), pp. 777–95.
25 Ibid.
26 Simon Shen, ‘A Constructed (un)reality on China’s Re-entry into Africa: the Chinese online
community perception of Africa (2006–2008)’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47:3 (2009),
pp. 425–48.
27 Ibid., p. 439.
28 Ibid., p. 441.
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international community project, and to define and express its liberalism directly
through development policy. Finally, this incorporation of Africa into the British
sense of itself has pervaded the political scene more widely; to the point that
Britain’s new coalition government has committed itself to continuing the
engagement and policy.29
‘Gin-soaked Africa’: the need for a villain
British self-idealisation in Africa draws on a lineage of discourse about Britain’s
good role in Africa which has woven in and out of British engagement there since
the abolition of the slave trade.30 At some times, and in some hands, it has been
used rhetorically to justify or disguise more venal British interests. But it has also
contained a deeper and more profound meaning for many people in Britain,
coming to define the way Britain has viewed itself and its role in the world as
enlightened. Within this discourse there has always been the need for a villainous
other – the Americans, French and Portugese during the abolition debates; the
French and Belgians during the late 19th Century colonial expansion; China itself,
for example during the early part of the 20th Century.31
Britain’s representation of Africa as a site of its own grander purpose was
manifest in its uniquely noble role in the abolition of the slave trade – the pursuit
of what was right, against its own self-interest – is a cherished part of the British
myth of itself.32 Its colonial expansion in the late 19th Century was also
represented as one of serving wider, humane interests, such as the promotion of
free trade for the benefit of the world, and the promotion of progress and salvation
for Africans.33 As Alice Conklin argues, such views were more than rhetorical.
‘The faith of yesterday’s empire builders in the moral legitimacy of their enterprise
was all but absolute.’34 This is not to deny the more selfish motivations involved,
particularly during the colonial conquest itself. However, a more ‘enlightened’
29 For example, the Queen’s speech immediately following the 2010 election promised that the new
government would honour the previous government’s commitment to increasing overseas aid to
0.7 per cent of GNI by 2013. See {http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/News-Stories/2010/Firm-
commitment-to-07/} cited on 17 June 2010.
30 The colonial era allowed far more leeway to overtly aggressive approaches to Africa. The defence
of British material interests – its need for markets and primary commodities, its jostling with
European colonial powers for position and influence – appeared to be more natural and justifiable
than are allowed in Britain today. It might therefore be argued that the colonial era contained a
greater (if tacit) acknowledgement that altruism was mixed in with self-interest than is the case,
certainly in Britain, today.
31 For example, see Thomas Fowell Buxton, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy (London: John
Murray, 1840); Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: a story of greed, terror and heroism in
colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin Company, 1999); Gary Kynoch, ‘“Your Petitioners are in
Mortal Terror”: the violent world of Chinese workers in South Africa, 1904–1910’, Journal of
Southern African Studies, 31:3 (2005).
32 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837, 2nd edition (New Haven, Conn. London: Yale
Nota Bene, 2005).
33 For one of the most coherent explanations of Britain’s higher motives in Africa, see the memoirs of
Nigeria’s first British governor Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa
(London: William Blackwood, 1926).
34 Alice Conklin, ‘Colonialism and Human Rights, a Contradiction in Terms? The case of France and
West Africa, 1895–1914’, American Historical Review, 103:2 (1998), p. 419.
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approach was a significant element, both rhetorically and in this sense of the
British state engaging in a pure and good cause.
An important part of the way in which British actors explained and justified their
role in Africa was in terms of the contrast with others with less benign intentions.
Thomas Buxton, for example, details the barbaric practices of the Portugese and
various slave traders from the Americas, which shocked British policymakers and
public and led to the British naval blockade of west Africa in an attempt to stop the
trade, and the government’s support of Sierra Leone, the struggling colony for freed
slaves.35 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the British were equally
stirred up by accounts of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, brought to public attention
by E. D. Morel and the sensational report by Roger Casement in 1904.36 And the
French always featured heavily in comparisons made between the welfare of the
natives in British and French-owned colonies. Africans, it was argued, fared better
under the British who were concerned with their material and spiritual improvement
and were altruistically engaged in stamping out slavery and fetish-practices, while the
French sold them cheap gin and selfishly reserved African markets for themselves.37
Unsurprisingly, French attempts to depict their role in a more positive light
were dismissed as hypocrisy by the British. As the British Governor of Sierra
Leone Edward Cardew said of the French colonies in west Africa: ‘The secret of
their success appears to be that they keep their motto of “Egalite, Liberte et
Fraternite” for home consumption and do not apply it to those colonies where the
people are not suﬃciently educated and civilised for it.’38 This strongly paternalistic
tone echoes uncomfortably today in many of the comments made about China’s
corrupting influence on apparently incapable Africans.
Britain apparently needed an alter-ego in its dealings with Africa. It was as
though its own ‘good’ could only be properly realised through the contrast that
could be made with others who showed no principle in their dealings with Africa.
Even while there is a sense of the mission to reform, save and enlighten the ‘dark
continent’, always on the sidelines are the spoilers. To what extent are these an
essential ingredient to the British self-conception as a ‘good’ actor in Africa? I will
return to this question in the conclusion. First, I want to detail the modern
manifestation of the spoiler to British eﬀorts in Africa: China.
China as a villain in Africa
In the modern British account of Anglo-African relations, China takes on the role
of villain once reserved for other European nations. Indeed, China’s emergence in
35 Buxton, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy.
36 Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost.
37 A flavour of this can be found in a newspaper report of 1899 about the protests of liquor traﬃc in
Africa. ‘Crowded and earnest was the meeting yesterday of the Native Races and Liquor Traﬃc
United Committee at Grosvenor House. The Duke of Westminster took the chair. In 1894, he said,
the imported spirits into Lagos were valued at £117,139. Then the duty was raised to 2s a gallon,
with the result that the import of 1896 was only £58,906. In proportion the natives became
industrious and respectable. Contrast Dahomey under French rule, where spirits were only taxed at
8d per gallon, and the consumption rose from 1,000,000f worth in 1894 to 4,000,000f worth in 1896.’
The Star, ‘Gin-Soaked Africa’ (18 May 1899), p. 2.
38 Governor Edward Cardew to the Secretary of State for the Colonial Oﬃce (Rt Hon, Joseph
Chamberlain), 28 May 1898, Government papers Colonial Oﬃce Dispatches, Sierra Leone (1898).
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Africa is a potentially confusing and destabilising one. If a flattened and idealised
Africa appears to confirm possibilities for good intervention by Britain as a liberal
actor, an equally flattened China can be seen to represent a rejection of and threat
to it, undermining both British predominance in Africa by presenting an alternative
non-liberal partner, and disrupting the idealised, smooth international liberal order.
In popular British accounts of China in Africa, China is depicted as a
straightforward villain. This can be seen in media discussions of China in Africa,
as discussed by Emma Mawdsley,39 and through comments made by political elites
which broadly echo (if in slightly more restrained terms) the media line. The story
of China as villain unfolds in four steps. First, Africa is helpless: its leaders are
corrupt and/or inept; its populations battered and long-suﬀering. Second, the
British have led the way in developing a rescue plan that will induce better
behaviour from Africa’s leaders towards Africa’s populations. Myles Wickstead,
the senior oﬃcial in charge of Blair’s Commission for Africa said:
In a number of countries you don’t or you haven’t had the systems whereby governments
can be electorally accountable with strong parliaments and whatever. So in a way I think
the donor community has historically acted as a little bit of a proxy for the electorate in
those countries and tried to stand up for the ordinary person, saying these sugar prices are
penalising your people and shouldn’t you do something about that? So I think in a way,
for perfectly honourable motives, the international community has acted as a proxy and an
advocate of people.40
This approach rests implicitly on the notion that African leaders are corrupt, bad,
non-liberal or non-progressive while African populations are prototype liberal
individuals waiting and wanting British representation.41 It has led to donor
attempts at political and social reform in Africa, in which continuing aid and debt
relief are granted to governments in return for democratic reform, good govern-
ance initiatives and an observance of human rights. It is carried through by policies
such as DfID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ project whereby ‘progressive’ leadership and
policy environments are encouraged.42 In pursuing this policy, Britain has chosen
an approach that is ‘diﬀerent from politics as usual’, defining Africa as a ‘noble
cause’, above normal grubby self-interest, emphasising its aﬃnity with and ability
to represent African people in a disinterested way.43
Third, it is argued that the Chinese engagement with Africa is motivated by an
almost gluttonous need for raw materials and new markets, driven by a monolithic and
powerful Chinese state that defines and directs policy. Unlike the British, the Chinese
are all about material self-interest.44 Because of this selfishness, the Chinese are not
interested in addressing Africa’s real problems – which have been defined within the
prevailing universal liberal norms as those of governance and human rights abuses.
And so, four, by engaging with corrupt leaders, they are spoiling Britain’s good work.
39 Emma Mawdsley, ‘Fu Manchu Versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China,
Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers’, Political Geography, {doi; 10.1016/
j.polgeo.2008.03.006} (2008).
40 Interview (27 June 2007).
41 Young, ‘A Project to be Realised’.
42 See Governance and Social Development Resource Centre website: {http//www.gsdrc.org}.
43 Blair, ‘Speech on Africa, Addis Ababa, 7 October 2004’.
44 Such a view both underestimates Chinese ideological motivations, and the plurality of Chinese
actors. See Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009) and Alden et al.
(eds), China Returns to Africa.
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‘The Chinese are all over Africa’,45 and they ‘will work with anybody. They put
no conditions, make no demands, get very good deals.’46 Given the poor records
of many African governments, China’s approach of working to support existing
regimes is inherently damaging to Africa. ‘China is a very ruthless player in Africa
[. . .] China is prepared to overlook what is going on on the ground, providing its
interests are served, the classic example being Sudan where they are a major
investor in terms of oil and politically they block most attempts to resolve the
catastrophe in Darfur.’47
In particular it is frequently pointed out that China’s dealings with African
elites are corrupting and damaging to Western attempts to inhibit their excesses.
‘The list of [China’s] “friends” [. . .] would not look out of place in a rogues’
gallery.’48 In particular, China’s support for Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir
is seen as entrenching the abuse of human rights and prolonging suﬀering in
Zimbabwe and Sudan. ‘It’s been very diﬃcult to get any sanctions against the
[Sudanese] regime, precisely because of the [Chinese] assertion of self-interest.’49
British state actors argue that Western donors’ attempts to reform or remove
Africa’s rogues through conditionalities or sanctions, were slowly beginning to
have the desired eﬀects. But ‘that’s all going to go by the board if China does what
it’s doing’.50
The Chinese investment in Africa is potentially the most destabilising force that there
is [. . .] If you look at Zimbabwe and the way in which the EU has tried to impose
sanctions and there’s been all this quiet diplomacy involving the other south African states,
and then China just goes in and provides them with all their oil on the basis that they get
access to a whole range of industries and markets and resources there. Faced with that it’s
very diﬃcult to put pressure on a regime and pressure on UK companies [. . .] If you have
an approach which is very managed, very technocratic, and therefore sometimes quite
diﬃcult for politicians to come to grips with, very idealistic, and progresses quite slowly, in
a very painstaking fashion [. . .] and then China comes along and says, give us your
rainforest and we’ll give you a billion quid, let’s forget about all this grief to get a few
million from the UK, let’s go with China. That’s where the problem is.51
Because the Chinese package appears more attractive to corrupt African elites, the
British will be squeezed out and Africa’s poor will suﬀer. ‘People are very
apprehensive of [China’s] rapid expansion in Africa. Part of our fear may well be
that after a long period of being able to influence what happens in Africa, this is
slipping from our grasp. Yet there are real reasons to be deeply apprehensive about
what is happening.’52
45 Interview, Baroness Jenny Tonge, Liberal Democrat Spokesperson on International Development,
1997–2004 (17 May 2007).
46 Interview, Jeremy Corbyn, MP, Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Angola (31 January 2007).
47 Interview, Chris Mullin, MP, Minister for Africa, 2003–2005 (21 March 2007).
48 Baroness Patricia Rawlings, comments during the House of Lords Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese
Investment’
(6 February 2007), {http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007–02–06b.593.233} cited on 19 May
2009.
49 Interview, John Bercow, MP, Conservative Spokesman for International Development, 2003–2005
(23 April 2007).
50 Interview, John Austin, MP, Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Ethiopia (19 February 2007).
51 Interview, Sally Keeble, MP, International Development Minister, 2002–2003 (4 June 2007).
52 Baroness Lindsay Northover, comments during the House of Lords Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese
Investment’ (6 February 2007), {http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007–02–06b.593.233}
cited on 19 May 2009.
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It is not only the buttressing of Africa’s corrupt regimes that disturbs British
politicians. China’s policy, which is depicted as following economic and political
self-interest, means that its attempts to sell goods in Africa will swamp African
markets and squeeze out local manufacturing. Where China does move production
to Africa, it is widely believed that Chinese workers are imported, limiting local
employment. Moreover, China’s own rapid development presents ‘a real danger
that people in African countries are going to be left right behind’.53
A debate in the House of Lords in 2007, in which speakers lined up to agree
with each other, illustrates the strength of feeling about the corrupting influence of
China and the way in which this is a subject of consensus across the political
parties. It expresses the common feeling that British idealism in Africa can be
clearly contrasted with Chinese realism. Two quotes give a flavour:
The Chinese have shown little or no interest in issues such as the rule of law, free elections,
respect for human rights and stamping out corruption. They dish out the loans, the gifts
and the pet projects with no questions asked, sometimes supporting and even propping up
very dubious regimes under the rubric, which is so important to them internationally, of
mutual non-interference. So the infrastructure created and the new loans made may suit the
African regimes concerned but may not be in the long-term interests of the host country
concerned. [Compare this with] [. . .] the response of governments such as our own, which
have taken an excellent lead on Africa [. . .] The enlightened world community has, by and
large, got the right approach at last to Africa.54
What about the wonderful work in cancelling world debt? Again, Her Majesty’s
government have been in the forefront of that; will they watch that the new governments of
Africa do not create fresh indebtedness, so that in a few years’ time we find that the
campaign has to start all over again [. . .] As Africans say, it is better to teach a person to
fish than to give them a fish, because the chances are likely that they will get their economy
going properly. Her Majesty’s government have assisted countries in Africa, teaching them
how to fish without necessarily just giving the fish. The Chinese are arriving, giving a lot of
fish.55
The depiction of China as a potentially destructive player in Africa is employed
over and over again as a useful foil to Britain’s virtuous role there. China’s role
as villain becomes an amplification of the way African elites are perceived as
corrupt, disruptive and outside the moral order.
China as a partner in Africa
Alongside these popular negative depictions, an alternative government discourse
about China’s engagement in Africa is emerging, one that suggests that Chinese
actors can be civilised and absorbed – socialised – into the liberal cosmopolitan
order. In this depiction, China is a potential partner in British good work in
Africa, and potentially part of the international consensus. This oﬃcial line on
53 Interview, Baroness Lindsay Northover, Liberal Democrat Spokesperson for International Devel-
opment, 2003-present (14 June 2007).
54 Lord Holme of Cheltenham, comments during the House of Lords Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese
Investment’ (6 February 2007), {http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007–02–06b.593.233}
cited on 19 May 2009.
55 Archbishop of York, comments during the House of Lords Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese Investment’
(6 February 2007), {http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007–02–06b.593.233} cited on 19 May
2009.
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China in Africa has been driven by a number of key oﬃcials from DfID and the
FCO and it has recently become more visible and influential. It is defined and
explained within the FCO ‘Framework for Engagement’ published in January
2009. The document sets out China’s growing importance and explains why and
how the UK hopes to benefit from a closer relationship with it. The basis for the
framework is explained in Gordon Brown’s introduction in which he says: ‘I am
convinced that Britain, Europe and the rest of the world can benefit from China’s
rise – provided we get our response right.’56 The first benefits are to Britain’s own
interests, served by closer cooperation with China as a trading partner. The second
are to the wider international objectives that China can, if brought to behave
responsibly, help to serve. The chief of these are carbon emissions and African
development.57
As Daniel Large points out, ‘reactions to the perceived dramatic irruption of
China into the continent are almost as revealing about the preoccupations of
diﬀerent involved actors concerning the rise of China in world aﬀairs, and the
track-record of previous involvement by external partners in Africa, as the nature
of the Chinese engagement in the continent per se’.58 The line followed in the
framework document very explicitly makes a bid for Chinese aﬀection, to ‘get in
there’ with a partner of increasing economic and political importance. There are far
more overt material interests in the UK-China relationship than in the UK-Africa
relationship. Part of the question for British oﬃcials then is how to reconcile such
interests with the more idealist approach to Africa policy.
There are two, interlinking answers to this problem. The first is based on the
idea that China can be socialised, more specifically that Britain can ‘tame’ China,
to bring it round to responsible and right-minded action in its international
dealings (following Chakrabarty). ‘This is about encouraging an approach of
responsible sovereignty on international and global issues, from proliferation and
international security to sustainable development and climate change. It’s also
about helping China to define its interests increasingly broadly.’59 The second sees
China pushed into the ‘right kinds of behaviour’ by increasing interdependence, a
very rational account of international politics along the lines of utopian liberalism
as defined by E. H. Carr: what Britain seeks to do because of its interest in the
welfare of Africans, China will eventually have to pursue because of its
self-interest.60
China’s role in Africa can thus be discussed within an assumption that its
objectives are essentially those of Britain. China is purported to share a British
56 Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce, The UK and China: a framework for Engagement, p. 3.
57 Ibid., p. 4.
58 Daniel Large, ‘Africa’s international China relations: contending imaginaries and changing politics
amidst the realities of consolidation’, in preparation for Jacques Mangala (ed.), Africa in
Contemporary International Relations (Palgrave, forthcoming 2010).
59 Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce, The UK and China: a framework for Engagement, p. 5.
60 See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1991–1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). Clare Short,
Secretary of State for International Development between 1997 and 2002, described the Govern-
ment’s approach to ‘enlightened self-interest’ or harmonious interests in the following way: ‘Whether
it was the case in the past, and it probably was in the heyday of Empire, that what was morally right
and what was in Britain’s self-interest were probably contradictory, it is no longer the case. And I
mean that, I’m not just rationalising it. And that’s a delight because you don’t have any confusion,
you can just get on with what’s right: it’s in Africa’s interest, it’s in Europe’s interest, it’s in the
world’s interest.’ Interview (6 June 2007).
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desire to see the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and increases
in aid – shared objectives that ‘make it easy for Britain to work with China’.61 This
view at times appears to represent China and Britain as like-minded partners
working together for the welfare of Africans. Or, assumptions about a universal,
technical approach to engagement in Africa come into play. For instance, one
comment frequently made by oﬃcials concerns the unsustainability of China’s
much-vaunted policy of non-interference which the realities of working in Africa
will inevitably erode. British objectives of stability and capacity-building in Africa
follow a logic which China will come to appreciate are in its own interests. China
‘is slowly moving on policies of non-intervention. It’s got to because Africa is
complicated. It’s messy. The deeper you get in, the more you need to commit to
development in Africa – to respond to the many voices jumping up and down over
China. They must slowly realise that they cannot just deal with state leaders.’62
Together, these imply a potentially harmonious conflation of British material
interests and British ideological ambitions. ‘We should keep working more closely
with China, demonstrating why good governance, sustainable development, donor
coordination and aid eﬀectiveness improve development outcomes and will help
secure China’s own rapidly growing stake in the developing world.’63
Privately, oﬃcials are not always rosy-eyed about what they describe as China’s
tendency to pursue self-interest at the expense of development objectives in Africa.
However, they echo the public line when they suggest that, even if the relationship
can be exploitative, it also may have plenty to oﬀer Africa, if it is slightly redirected
along the right lines. Thus, as one oﬃcial told me, ‘Our ambition is to attempt to
bring China into a common conversation about Africa and development there.’64
DfID and FCO oﬃcials are busy trying to make this work in practice. There
is discussion of Chinese cooperation with DfID and attempts to define suitable
joint ventures and programmes. The discourse represents China as coming late to
a concern for development in Africa and Britain being in a good position to teach
it what the proper direction and focus should be.65 Once again, this is in some
senses an amplification of the idealisation Britain projects onto Africa itself in its
imagination of the African poor as essentially prototype liberal individuals waiting
for British actors to help them realise the type of government they desire. In the
case of China, it depicts the Chinese as being awoken to the logic of liberal-style
intervention in Africa as in everyone’s best interests.
The Chinese appear slightly bemused by this line, remaining protective of
China’s avowed approach of non-interference in Africa, which they see as coming
from common experiences of colonialism, developing country and non-aligned
status, and their own ability to reduce poverty which is based on their recent
unparalleled experience of rapid economic development.66 Hongying Wang argues
that the possibilities for China’s socialisation are limited. In a discussion of the ways
in which China has begun to become more active in multilateral initiatives, he
61 Comment made by a DfID oﬃcial (12 October 2009).
62 Ibid.
63 Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce, The UK and China: a framework for Engagement, p. 11.
64 Conversation with FCO oﬃcial (1 October 2009).
65 See, for example, the DfID paper ‘Promoting Growth in Africa: working with China’, published on
the DfID website: {http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/china-africa-factsheet.pdf} cited
on 16 October 2009.
66 Conversation with a Chinese diplomat (4 November 2009).
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points to the essentially instrumental approach China takes. ‘The PRC’s commit-
ment to the principles of qualitative multilateralism is constrained by the govern-
ment’s determination to preserve national sovereignty, its insistence on policy
flexibility, and its lingering anxiety that multilateralism may be an instrument
serving American interests in the region.’67 Multilateralism is ‘simply a strategic tool
of the Chinese government. As such, its applicability seems entirely negotiable if the
material conditions should change’.68 There is already evidence of the limits of
multilateral cooperation from the EU whose eﬀorts to forge closer cooperation with
the Chinese on a range of issues have been frustrated to the point that the European
Council on Foreign Relations report on Chinese cooperation with the EU, has
argued that China is treating the EU ‘with diplomatic contempt’.69
If China’s potential socialisation is as limited as this suggests, how will Britain
cope? Perhaps it will be less of a problem than it might appear, at least in terms
of the British self-conception as a liberal actor. In the concluding section of the
article I will suggest that the continuation of China as villain in Africa might even
provide a sense of relief for British actors. This, I think, highlights a sense of
ambiguity over the potential universalism of liberalism.
Conclusion: suggestions on the dual approach
How can we read this double approach and what might happen next? I explore
here two possible answers. The first pursues the idea that the two approaches might
need and continue to coexist, and the second suggests the idea that interests might
increasingly dominate British policy in Africa, overcoming or at least balancing out
more idealist influences.
First, what might it mean that both demonisation of China and an attempt to
rehabilitate China coexist? I have argued that both contribute to Britain’s identity
as a good actor in Africa. The need to demonise China, to see its activity as flat
and alien supports Britain’s role in Africa as idealised and good. Such conceptions
are durable – and historically resonant – and find popular representations in the
media. They also amplify existing British conceptions of corrupt African leaders,
Africa’s conflicts, Africa’s diseases, Africa’s conflict and Africa’s chaos as malign
and frightening: in other words, they reinforce the ways in which the idea of Africa
has come to constitute British self-identity. At the same time, Britain as a tutor and
civiliser of China also oﬀers a contribution to Britain’s self-conception as a
significant world player and liberal evangelist.
And yet the potential socialisation of China must presumably disable oppor-
tunities for demonisation: the two approaches appear contradictory. Julia Kristeva,
in her work on European cosmopolitanism, explores its philosophical struggle with
erasing diﬀerence, of extending political order – the concept of universalism –
which she traces to the ancient Greeks who defined the barbarian as the enemy of
67 Hongying Wang, ‘Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: the limits of socialization’, Asian
Survey, 40:3 (2000), p. 484.
68 Ibid., p. 486.
69 John Fox and Francoise Godement, Power Audit of EU-China Relations, European Council on
Foreign Relations (17 April 2009).
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civilisation. ‘And yet the barbarians were fascinating, and, as if echoing the
Sophists, writers would distinguish good barbarians from the bad, the best
obviously being those who were perfectable – those who could be assimilated into
Greek culture.’70
Here is an apparent tension between the desire to remain fascinated by
diﬀerence and the desire to incorporate it. Kristeva traces this tension throughout
the history of European thought. ‘Diﬀerence’, she argues, can be understood as
both involving the projection of denied aggression, and an enjoyment of watching
its progress. This attempt to evacuate and control the uncomfortable or aggressive
leads to a form of cosmopolitanism that defines otherness on one’s own terms and
seeks to subject it to supposedly universal principles.71
The perception of China’s villainy might therefore be seen as stemming from
and reinforcing a British denial of aggression. Whereas Britain is imagined as
purely benign in its dealings with Africa, all aggression is projected onto China.
The refusal to see China’s role as complex – its varied actors, its mixture of
motives, the variety of relationships involved – leaves China to represent a mirror
image, villain to the British hero. China’s otherness provides a depository for the
aggression and diﬀerence that are denied in the British relationship with Africa.
Moreover, I want to suggest that this projected aggression is associated with an
excited fascination: is there something almost pleasurable in the British horror of
watching China’s supposed venality in Africa? This is an amplification of the
tendency to demonise some African political leaders, to dwell on ‘the horror’ of
corruption and conflict that for many provides Africa’s most distinguishing
features. I am thinking here of the type of writing typified by Robert Kaplan in
his article ‘The Coming Anarchy’ which presents a picture of African descending
into a hellish state of chaos and horror.72 Much of the recent press coverage of
China in Africa strikes a very similar note with headlines such as ‘How China has
created a new slave empire in Africa’, ‘Why China is trying to colonise Africa’ and
‘How China is taking over Africa, and why the West should be VERY worried’.73
Such media coverage reflects the extreme end of ‘the horror’ but is essentially
commensurate with the views expressed by some state elites.
In his discussion of American-Sino relations, Gries describes an ongoing ritual
whereby the ‘Chinese, like the Americans, project their fears and fantasies onto our
bilateral relations’,74 a common theme in international relationships. In this case,
aggression and fear, denied in an idealised relationship with Africa, needs a home.
As a result, the possibility of political complexity is denied by the projection of
extremes of good and bad – seen in discourse about ‘good guys/bad guys’; ‘for
70 Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991), p. 52.
71 Ibid.
72 Robert Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly (February 1994).
73 Peter Hitchens, ‘How China has created a new slave empire in Africa’, Mail Online (28 September
2008), {www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1063198/PETER-HI. . .-How-China-created-new-
slave-empire-Africa.html} cited on 14 May 2009; David Blair, ‘Why China is trying to colonise Africa’,
Telegraph.co.uk (1 March 2009), {www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3642345/Why-China-
is-trying-to-colonise-Africa.html} cited on 7 May 2009; Andrew Malone, ‘How China’s taking over
Africa, and why the West should be VERY worried’, Mail Online (18 July 2008), {www.dailymail.co.
uk/news/worldnews/article-1036105/How-Chinas-taking-Africa-West-VERY-worried.html} cited on 7
May 2009.
74 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 11.
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us/against us’. The idea of Chinese ‘bad guys’ coming to the defence of Africa’s
‘bad guys’, and undermining the eﬀorts of us, the ‘good guys’, is a process that is
at once understandable and even manageable within the context of an Africa that,
although ‘other’, is known and safe. As such China intensifies the way Britain
imagines Africa, and provides relief to its conception of itself.
This tendency to demonise a third actor is clearly not a specifically liberal
response to international relationships and the idea of the other. Indeed Kristeva
argues that the projection of aggression, rather than the inevitability of rationality,
is the basis of what is universal to humans.75 In his analysis of the online story of
China and Africa, Shen finds many references to the superiority of the Chinese
approach to that of America and Europe which are ‘never sincere’ while the
‘unconditional aid oﬀered by the Chinese “is not another form of colonialism” but
grants the Africans “a sense of confidence that cannot be gained from the
Europeans”’.76 Shen suggests that: ‘Africans have become convenient straw men
through whom Chinese internet users can project their wished-for Chinese
identities.’77 He captures the blend of contempt for Africans and an idealisation of
China’s help for Africa which underlines my two points of the projection of
aggression and this sense of over-keen involvement in a pathologised Africa.
Finally, the dual British reaction to China in Africa points to an important
characteristic of the very idealised liberal cosmopolitanism expressed in relation to
Africa; namely a sense of ambiguity about the universality of liberalism. China’s
dual representation as outlying villain – beyond the ‘universal’ – and as potential
ideological partner, underwrites this ambiguity. Is there simply too much to lose by
China’s socialisation? On the other hand, keeping the two discourses going draws
on a tried and tested approach that allows for the projection and enjoyment of
aggression and an aspiration to the rationalist fantasy of taming the aggression and
enhancing the order and stability of the existing liberal hegemony which China will
be brought to appreciate under the tutorship of Britain.
Such a position produces very little more than a familiar underpinning of a
particular British self-conception, without enabling more widely productive rela-
tionships with either China or Africa. Moreover, with deepening relationships
between Chinese and Africans that are beyond British control, it may also be
unsustainable. The second explanation of the dual approach sees the emergence of
a more rational oﬃcial discourse as a sign that realism is slipping into the
British-Africa relationship, albeit by virtue of British interests in China, and that
this may muddy a sense of British idealisation of itself in Africa. Between an
idealist view of the relationship with Africa and a more interest-based perspective
on the relationship with China, British state actors are caught in the juxtaposition
of ideas and interests, and may be forced to contemplate a thicker conception of
each relationship.
This could be an attempt to have it all ways, to keep Britain as a ‘good’ actor
in Africa while it works harmoniously with China for its own and Africa’s best
interests. In other words, rationality overcomes the aggression that Britain is
projecting onto China. The socialisation discourse is suggestive here, implying that
75 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves.
76 Shen, ‘A Constructed (un)reality on China’s Re-entry into Africa’, p. 442.
77 Ibid.
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China is apparently to be enfolded within the benign liberal approach. In this
depiction, the realities are smoothed into line rhetorically, through the idea that
Britain has a pedagogical relationship with China as the new investor in African
development. From a Kristevian perspective, diﬀerence has been contained and
neutralised by the repression of aggression and an idealisation of universality. As
Wong suggests, however, Chinese actors may well be reluctant to play along with
this story.
Alternatively, more ambiguity might be allowed to seep into the idealised
Britain-Africa relationship and a more complex understanding of Britain and
China in Africa would emerge, in which the mixture of realism and idealism is
acknowledged. Such an approach would require that self-idealisation is relin-
quished – both that Britain is purely disinterested in Africa and that Britain can
‘tame’ China. It would demand better self-awareness, but it might also be
symptomatic of a more mature, complex and integrated understanding of both
relationships.
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